13 research outputs found
Brain Death as the End of a Human Organism as a Self-moving Whole
The biophilosophic justification for the idea that âbrain deathâ is death needs to support two claims: that what dies in human death is a human organism, not merely a psychological entity distinct from it; that total brain failure signifies the end of the human organism as a whole. Defenders of brain death typically assume without argument that the first claim is true and argue for the second by defending the âintegrative unityâ rationale. Yet the integrative unity rationale has fallen on hard times. In this article, I give reasons for why we should think of ourselves as organisms, and why the âfundamental workâ rationale put forward by the 2008 Presidentâs Council is better than the integrative unity rationale, despite persistent objections to it
How (not) to think of the âdead-donorâ rule
Although much has been written on the dead-donor rule in the last twenty-five years, scant attention has been paid to how it should be formulated, what its rationale is, and why it was accepted. The DDR can be formulated in terms of either a Donât Kill rule or a Death Requirement, the former being historically rooted in absolutist ethics and the latter in a prudential policy aimed at securing trust in the transplant enterprise. I contend that the moral core of the rule is the Donât Kill rule, not the Death Requirement. This, I show, is how the DDR was understood by the transplanters of the 1960s, who sought to conform their practices to their ethicsâunlike todayâs critics of the DDR, who rethink their ethics in a question-begging fashion to accommodate their practices. A better discussion of the ethics of killing is needed to move the debate forward
The Inviolateness of Life and Equal Protection: A Defense of the âDead Donorâ Rule
There are increasing calls for rejecting the âdead donorâ rule and permitting âorgan donation euthanasiaâ in organ transplantation. I argue that the fundamental problem with this proposal is that it would bestow more worth on the organs than the donor who has them. What is at stake is the basis of human equality, which, I argue, should be based on an ineliminable dignity that each of us has in virtue of having a rational nature. To allow mortal harvesting would be to make our worth contingent upon variable quality of life of judgments that can only be based on properties that come in degrees. Thus, rejecting the âdead donorâ rule comes at the expense of our egalitarian principles with respect to the value each individual human life has in relation to the protections against killing
In defense of xenotransplantation research: Because of, not in spite of, animal welfare concerns
It is envisioned that one day xenotransplantation will bring about a future where transplantable organs can be safely and efficiently grown in transgenic pigs to help meet the global organ shortage. While recent advances have brought this future closer, worries remain about whether it will be beneficial overall. The unique challenges and risks posed to humans that arise from transplanting across the species barrier, in addition to the costs borne by non-human animals, has led some to question the value of xenotransplantation altogether. In response, we defend the value of xenotransplantation research, because it can satisfy stringent welfare conditions on the permissibility of animal research and use. Along the way, we respond to the alleged concerns, and conclude that they do not currently warrant a cessation or a curtailing of xenotransplantation research